

**STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND CIRCUIT
430 Fannin Street
Shreveport, LA 71101
(318) 227-3700**

No. 56,930-KW

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

DAYTON REVEL CORBETT

FILED: 01/30/26

RECEIVED: E-FILED 01/16/26

On application of Dayton Revel Corbett for SUPERVISORY WRIT in No. 403,591 on the docket of the First Judicial District, Parish of CADDO, Judge Christopher T. Victory.

John David Shepherd, Jr.

Counsel for:

Dayton Revel Corbett

James Edward Stewart, Sr.

Counsel for:

State of Louisiana

Courtney Ray

Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and ELLENDER, JJ.

WRIT GRANTED; AFFIRMED.

The applicant, Dayton Revel Corbett, seeks supervisory review of his misdemeanor conviction of prohibited sexual conduct between educator and student in violation of La. R.S. 14:81.4. Corbett challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him and argues that he was denied his right to trial by jury.

Applicant contests the State's proof that any specific act of sexual conduct occurred, asserting that the State's theory requires acceptance of an implausible factual scenario, and that the conviction rests entirely on uncorroborated testimony lacking any support. At trial, the victim, a student at the high school at which Corbett taught, testified about acts of sexual intercourse as defined by La. R.S. 14:81.4(B) between her and 29-year-old Corbett beginning in September of 2021 when she was 17 years old and ending in May of 2022, after she had turned 18. If believed, the testimony of the victim alone is sufficient to support the conviction. Additionally, Hughes' testimony that she once saw the victim sitting in Corbett's lap in his classroom before the two quickly broke away corroborates the claim that an inappropriate relationship occurred between the teacher and student. The trial court heard and weighed any contradictions in this testimony as well as the explanations offered for those inconsistencies and is afforded much discretion in making credibility determinations. It is not the province of the reviewing court to disturb credibility determinations or reweigh evidence. *State v. Flores*, 52,639 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 1199, writ *denied*, 19-00877 (La. 11/25/19), 283 So. 3d 496. When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, we find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction and reject this claim. *Jackson v. Virginia*, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).

Corbett also argues that the trial court committed structural error by misclassifying the crime of prohibited sexual conduct between educator and student as a “petty misdemeanor” rather than a serious offense for which he was entitled to trial by jury. In turn, Corbett also complains that the trial court erred by failing to advise him of or obtain a valid waiver of his right to a jury trial. In support of his argument, Corbett cites the case of *Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, Nev.*, 489 U.S. 538, 109 S. Ct. 1289, 103 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1989), which held that an offense carrying a maximum jail term of six months or less will be *presumed* “petty,” but that a defendant is entitled to jury trial for the offense if he can demonstrate that any additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is a “serious” one.

Corbett argues that the fifteen-year sex offender registration, notification and statutory restrictions and legislative acknowledgement of the seriousness of this offense in La. R.S. 15:540, are sufficient to satisfy *Blanton, supra*. However, in *State v. Cook*, 16-1518 (La. 5/3/17), 226 So. 3d 387, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that the registration and notification law is a civil regulatory scheme that is intended to alert the public and law enforcement for purposes of public safety; it is not part of a sex offender’s punishment. More recently, the supreme court also noted that “whether applied to adults or juveniles,” Louisiana’s sex offender “registration requirement serves the ‘avowedly nonpunitive’ purpose of protecting public safety through timely dissemination of information,” and that “any punitive aspects of the registration requirement are incidental,” and insufficient to constitute “the clearest proof necessary to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” *State in Int. of D.D.*, 24-00254 (La. 6/27/25), 413 So. 3d 319 (finding that Louisiana’s sex offender registration law, when applied to a juvenile, did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment or implicate the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial). Applying these principles to this matter, we find no merit to Corbett’s argument. Because the maximum authorized penalty for first offense prohibited sexual conduct between an educator and student, does not exceed six months, a presumption exists that the Louisiana Legislature views this crime as a petty offense. Considering also the clear legislative intent that the Louisiana notification law is a civil regulatory scheme, we do not agree that the *Blanton* criteria have been satisfied. Pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 779, Corbett was not entitled to a jury trial. Thus, these claims are without merit.

The writ is granted and Dayton Revel Corbett’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

Shreveport, Louisiana, this 16 day of June, 2026.

DJE JJP

MS STEPHENS, J., would grant the writ to docket for further consideration.

FILED: June 16, 2026

Molly Melton
DEPUTY CLERK